A few problems with that assessment:

The North Korean argument was nonexistent up to the day that Pyongyang's nuclear hanky-panky behind the 1994 Agreed Framework was publicly announced. Then the DPRK became a rallying cry for those trying to pull the United States off of Iraq - which is frustrating, because the argument is transparent: those haranguing North Korea as the real threat are the same voices anticipating dire consequences in Iraq.

Forget the "backlash" theories; they're geopolitical Bigfoot sightings. Islamist terrorism gained strength in the Nineties precise because they were never engaged seriously. Afghanistan was al Qaeda's roost and immediately after heavy cluster bombing began, the effigy-burners scuttled home. No mass tumult or mass recruitments. Islamists may be fanatics but they retain self-preservation; a weak enemy inspired them and the Taliban's fall reiterated their place as the lower half in asymmetrical warfare. They scattered. Like any strongmen, they speak the language of power. Saddam's fall would embolden democrats in Iran and elsewhere, anyway; if the "Arab street" revolts, it will be for freedom.

The reasons for the fourteen-month-long American debate and seven-month-long United Nations haul center on the allied force necessary to counter or preclude Saddam's likely actions when cornered: strikes on troops, native civilians, Israel, Arab friendlies. What with? Biological or chemical weapons. Israel and the allies' military have equipment to operate under those attacks.

But they don't have equipment to deflect a successful nuke. Turn back to North Korea. When critics of the administration point to Pyongyang instead of Baghdad, they seldom mention what precise courses of action they'd prefer to see. That in itself is dubious, but I'll give them the benefit of the doubt: they'd like to see the same standard as applied to Iraq applied to North Korea. That means a harsh condemnation of the DPRK, a Security Council resolution, troop buildup beyond the ~40,000 from the Armistice, and disarmament verification. Needless to say, the situation would be indescribably more dangerous with the target bearing nuclear weapons that could just as easily strike troops as they could massive population centers of Seoul, Tokyo or Los Angeles.

So the United States, presumably, packs up tomorrow and begins diplomatic work against North Korea. Saddam, impervious to bluehelmets - he wouldn't have let them in if he couldn't continue his nuclear work - progresses towards nuclear capabilities. Back at the United Nations: a non-nuclear Saddam defeated the will of the Security Council, so it's already behind. Imagine what sort of fortified opposition, on the supposed principles of avoiding catastrophe, would be elicited by a fully nuclear Kim Jong Il. If a resolution could even be passed, the resistance to the eventual use of force (successfully fought tooth and nail in Baghdad's case) would be impervious.

Nothing happens for years. Saddam gains nuclear weapons. Both countries are now essentially innoculated from any diplomacy, let alone stepwise military engagement.

Iraq's necessity as the first rogue regime change is mostly due to its regional significance, notwithstanding some otherwise palpable ties to al Qaeda (you may be skeptical of the reports, but it's incorrect to state that there's *no* evidence). This is based on the idea of the Near East's timidity in the face of superior strength and yearning for Westernized, consensual government I raised above. No, Iraqis are not Islamists by and large (neither are Iranians, in spite of their governing mullahs). But Saddam is the militarized elephant in the room and his absence means an end to major military instability - his police state is the Near East's Jersey Pocket. That leaves no military worth mentioning besides Egypt; and its Western ties keep it from any significant enforcement of the status quo. With no reprisal to fear and at least one democratizing nation in their midst, Arabs and Muslims in pockets of Islamofascist culture will have reason to voice their already-strong discontent with life under autocracy in ways *other* than joining terrorists - who would rapidly lose money and habitat.

That's winning the war on terror and gaining some libertarian beachheads to boot.

I'm with you on the backlash, and even the potential reaction of the "Arab street," but is it too pithy to look at a good chunk of what you're saying and reduce it to "we'll go after Iraq because they're an easier target?" The elephant in the room when you're talking about the motivation of the United States is that we're doing this because it's convenient. Yeah, it achieves certain objectives, but you don't have, as you say, the concerns over nuclear retaliation that you might have with North Korea. These are exactly the kinds of things the administration seems either unwilling or unable to articulate when they talk about the two crises, although some of that may be for legitimate diplomatic reasons.

I think we're on the same page when you think about what the ramifications of backing down might be. You've just detailed them a lot more than I have.

-- is it too pithy to look at a good chunk of what you're saying and reduce it to "we'll go after Iraq because they're an easier target?" --

I can see that that's how it comes across; what I mean is that Iraq is the logical first target because its conversion directly facilitates destroying *both* terrorism and the colluding "Axis of Evil," whereas the others do not. Despite North Korea's penchant for arms sales, Iraq is unquestionably more connected to the primary threat of Islamist terrorism in both execution and polity. And even though Iran's mullahs conspicuously bankroll terrorism - placing them, from our current perspective, closer to terrorism than Iraq - Iran does not carry the regional weight of Saddam. Iran's fall would most likely do nothing for Iraqis; Saddam's police state is far too modern and expert. One would suspect Ba'athist forces, moreover, to infultrate a delicate, post-Islamist Tehran.

Iran's discontented youth, however, are not subject to Tikrit-style oppression: they find ways to hold pro-Westernization riots frequently. The impact of the Middle East's Stalinist strongman knocked down in record time could be enough encouragement for Iran's regime to quickly fall from internal revolt with minimal Western support.

So, too, would that precedent - a dictator cut down by free nations before he could seriously misbehave - affect Pyongyang's judgment of the situation. I prefer to believe, based on the history of strongmen responding to sincere threats of force, that North Korea would in fact move *away* from brinksmanship in their panic.

The important aspect to watch with the administration's North Korean policy is their insistence of Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear program *before* any substantial negotiations for aid begin. Apart from slated food shipments that, after my initial shock, appear to be more in the hopes of staving off mass starvation, the White House has not deviated from that position.

From this stance, the administration has gained a condemnation from the IAEA while submitting the matter to the Security Council for consideration. If the United Nations remains relevant beyond Iraq's liberation, the Security Council will be used to trap Pyongyang in the same situation as Baghdad - international standing will be dependent upon its disarmament, something neither regime would ever take seriously. The Bush administration would assemble a military threat of force (clandestine; shock-and-awe to the Nth) to fortify an anticipated resolution, betting that the deaths of Ba'athists and mullahs, as well as economic isolation, would play heavily on DPRK minds. They most likely wouldn't capitulate through the United Nations, but their confidence might be so rattled that the regime could either fall apart or become so dysfunctional and inoperative that military action would not risk nuclear retaliation.